Cyborg Work: Borders as Simulation

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ABSTRACT

Much recent research has focused on examining various binary contradictions and employing metaphors pertaining to border security. Ultimately, this article argues that existing debates and metaphors are inadequate in describing what is understood and agreed upon in the literature in terms of borders. This article proposes a refinement of existing theory for contemporary borders, employing Baudrillard (1981) concept of 'simulation'. The metaphor of the 'simulated border' functions to avoid debates surrounding geospatiality while also incorporating aspects of risk society and control in concluding that borders are anything but organic security environments, with the 'stretched screens' (Lyon 2009) of border agents serving to produce dividuals that are tested within games of security to govern mobility anywhere in time or space.

Keywords: border security; borders; theory; simulation; risk; control

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INTRODUCTION

Much of the contemporary literature in the interdisciplinary field of border studies has focused attention on the changing nature of borders from several contexts. These shifts have been well-documented in relation to the Canadian, U.S., and European literature in terms of: 1) the development of 'smart borders' (see Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008; Côté-Boucher 2008), including examinations of travel documents (Lyon 2009; McPhail et al. 2012; Muller 2009; Salter 2004; Salter 2006; Salter 2011; Sparke 2006) and the use of biometrics and other risk technologies (Amoore 2006; Broeders 2007; Muller 2009; Muller 2010a; and Muller 2011); 2) examinations of border geospatiality (or lack thereof), including employment of logics of 'remote control' (Broeders and Hampshire 2013), deterritoralization (Muller 2010a; Mountz 2011; and Salter and Mutlu 2013), the border as 'everywhere' (Lyon 2005), the border as part of a continuum also including other enforcement locales (Vaughan-Williams 2010), and as a form of visual 'security performance' (de Lint 2008; Rumford 2006) pushing security functions 'beyond the border' away from their traditional geographical limits; and 3) the securitization of refugees, irregular migrants, and citizenship (see for example Bigo 2002; Coutin 2005; Coutin 2010; Dauvergne 2007; Duffield 2010; Hyndman and Mountz 2008; McNevin 2010; Salter 2008).

Various binary debates as well as metaphors have been employed in the literature to attempt to explore borders theoretically while also incorporating the aforementioned disparate findings. Such metaphors have conceptualized borders as 'filters' (Muller 2011) and as 'firewalls' (Walters 2006a). This article will argue these metaphors have varying levels of success in avoiding pitfalls associated with the aforementioned literature, namely being unable to reconcile debates in the literature surrounding binary border mandates as well as opposing

geographical imaginaries. Border binaries also fail in incorporating previous findings related to a harmonized security-economy nexus, notions of risk, and also fall into a 'territorial trap' (Agnew 1994) that only serves to obscure other research.

This article ultimately proposes a revised theory and metaphor for contemporary border governance toward producing a representation more consistent with what is presently known (and agreed upon) in the field of borders and border security. The works of Baudrillard (1981) on simulation and Bogard (1996) on the simulation of surveillance will be especially instructive. By performing a content analysis of border training documents and manuals obtained via Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests filed with Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), this article will carry forward the argument that borders proceed as simulations, reducing personal narrative to binary data that allows for the governance of mobility and flows via risk within societies of control (Deleuze 1995), while also making borders transmutable anywhere social life is securitized irrespective of considerations of time and/or space.

LITERATURE REVIEW

BORDER BINARIES

As Newman (2006: 176) indicates, notions of difference and 'othering' in the form of binary pairings (inside versus outside, here versus there, and so forth) characterize much of the contemporary border discourse. Many of these binary distinctions have been brought about, as Rumford (2006: 155) contends, by a renewed theoretical focus on the changing nature of borders originating from many of the themes central to contemporary social theory, including globalization, cosmopolitanism, networked communities, mobilities, and flows. Parker and

Vaughan-Williams (2009: 584) in citing Derrida (1976) locate the seduction of binaries in their ability to produce a sense of security and certainty (pure imaginaries).

Such debates unfold in several zero-sum arguments related to governing borders, including: 1) security versus economy, 2) open borders versus closed borders, 3) separating a coherent inside from a chaotic outside, and 4) borders as geospatially specific versus borders as virtual or diffused. The first three binaries fall apart for two primary reasons. Firstly, recent literature suggests that border policies have moved toward coupling security and economic concerns not in opposition but rather as a mutually reinforcing (and indistinguishable) pair in the form of the security-economy nexus (see for example Ashby 2014; Coleman 2005; Lalonde 2012; Leese 2016; Sparke 2006). Secondly, and relatedly, the nearly universal acceptance in border literature that risk has come to dominate border policing and mobility governance efforts (see for example Aas 2011; Amoore 2013; Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Muller 2010a; Muller 2011), means binaries as well as distinctions like 'open' versus 'closed' are replaced by the governance of flows via data, which presupposes circulation.

The fourth binary requires closer examination. The assertion that borders have moved beyond the territorial limits of the sovereign state is well-supported in the literature (i.e. Broeders and Hampshire 2013; Mountz 2011; Salter and Mutlu 2013). For instance, Broeders and Hampshire (2013) discuss the contemporary digitization of the border as a refinement of the logic of 'remote control', in which "states project their immigration control measures overseas so that they identify and process would-be immigrants well before they arrive at the territorial border" (p. 1202). Through such digitization, associated security and control technologies as forms of governance have spread away from physical borders, and borders are said to experience

a concomitant shift from territorial boundaries of states to a potentially infinite number of sites (Broeders and Hampshire 2013: 1207).

The debate surrounding deterritorialization of borders is ultimately an uneasy one. While Lyon (2005) (in)famously declares "the border is everywhere", Vaughan-Williams (2010), for instance, concludes that the 'offshoring' of borders and security does not necessarily eradicate "commonsensical geographical notions about the location of borders" (p. 1074). Vaughan-Williams demonstrates this by exploring the UK's configuration of the border as part of a 'security continuum' that accommodates the continued use of physical borders alongside other enforcement locales. Others (de Lint 2008; Rumford 2006) point to the physical border as an important site of 'security performances' for states wishing to display to their citizenry that they have control over the flow of people and goods into and out of a state. In essence then, this literature contends that physical borders serve at the very least as sites for 'security theatre' (Schneier 2006: 38 as cited in Zedner 2009: 22) in the form of ritualistic shows (or acts) of security.

Ultimately, it can be concluded that the interdisciplinary study of borders falls into what Agnew (1994) refers to as the "territorial trap", or "the set of geographical assumptions that have combined to obscure the historicity and mutability of political space and territory" (Walters 2006a: 141). In other words, the interdisciplinary obsession with border geospatiality has served to obscure research focused on other aspects of borders and security.

BORDER METAPHORS

Walters (2006b) cites Balibar's (2002) notion of the 'ubiquity of borders' in suggesting that rather than disappearing, borders are actually proliferating and becoming "'a grid ranging

over the new social space' rather than a line separating it from outside" (Balibar 2002: 84-85 as cited in Walters 2006b: 199). Walters (2006a) develops the firewall metaphor as a possible alternative that avoids fixation with notions of geography. Firewalls basically function to identify 'risky' (or black-listed) data and subsequently, "Malicious packages are blocked, returned or perhaps 'quarantined'" (Walters 2006a: 152). Simultaneously, firewalls allow 'green-listed' data to move about the network. The firewall also has the ability to examine 'grey-listed' (or unknown) data and compare it against black-listed data for similarities, making decisions about whether to allow or deny the data based on risk. Thus the firewall metaphor allows moving beyond notions of borders as 'walls' to instead employing a filter logic in which borders ultimately aspire not to simply arrest movement, but rather "to produce and distribute both mobility and immobility" (Walters 2006a: 152).

Unfortunately, this metaphor only partially explains contemporary borders. Remote control implies that risky subjects and commodities are often intercepted by visa offices, airlines, commercial carriers, and so forth *before* they reach physical borders. Firewalls do not function via remote control to block packets before they leave their 'source location'. Rather, firewalls block packets of data at the back end – the gateway of the network – much like physical borders. Additionally, the firewall is completely 'responsible' for blocking risky data, and third parties such as ISPs, businesses, or individuals are largely uninvolved in protecting other third-party networks. Furthermore, while borders use databases to analyze risk associated with mostly known individuals (developed further below), firewalls must analyze disguised data packets against security cases the firewall (or other firewalls) have documented in the past. In short, unlike borders, firewalls are largely 'flying blind', without third-party assistance, as they combat

risks at the gateway of the network exclusively. In trying to avoid issues of geography, Walters (2006a) ultimately ends up describing traditional sovereign borders exclusively.

Muller (2011: 104) argues that as governance efforts shift from governing migration toward instead governing mobility under neoliberal risk-management strategies, borders should be imagined more as filters rather than as limits. As voluntary risk-management programs such as NEXUS in North America become more prevalent, the border begins to act as a filter, separating mobilities based on membership rights in what Muller (2010b: 80) calls 'multi-speed citizenship'. The border identifies 'safe citizenship' and serves to sort or filter according to an individual's digitized citizenship, or 'netizenship' (Muller 2010b: 83).

While the filter metaphor arguably avoids binary oppositions and geographical arguments while also adequately representing how trusted trader and traveler programs function, this metaphor also only partially explores how borders function to govern mobility. Filters are generally designed as membranes used to govern the flow of substances. They act to separate unwanted particles that are dissimilar to the desired substance. Other particles are confined within the membrane while the desired substance is permitted to flow through to its final destination. Filters work to separate different *physical* properties from each other. They do so by being able to interrupt *dissimilar* particles. Unlike borders, which tend to allow the movement of certain levels of risk, filters are low-tech in that they are generally not 'programmed' to discern between different levels of potentially 'risky' particles – they simply act to block *all* potentially risky particles (regardless of their actual risk). When water is filtered, a particle of dirt that poses little threat to human health will be blocked just as often as a deadly toxin like lead. Also, similar to the firewall metaphor, filters only work where installed and tend to protect a certain reservoir

or space (inside) from exterior particles (outside), which ignores the use of modern technologies of remote control to arrest flows *before* they can reach filters.

REVISING BORDER THEORY

Any revised metaphor for borders must be able to employ *everything* that is currently agreed upon in the literature regarding borders and security. This includes: 1) the work of bordering and related border technologies unfolds at an increasing variety of official state sites in addition to unofficial public and private non-state sites (both within individual nation states and around the world); 2) traditional physical, sovereign, and geographic borders persist and continue to perform various governance functions (regardless of the aforementioned developments); 3) borders and mobility are governed by and through the calculation and analysis of risk vis-à-vis information contained in databases; 4) borders operate by responsibilizing third parties (individuals, airlines, commercial carriers, and so forth) in collecting and reporting data on behalf of the state; 5) vis-à-vis the use of databases and information in governing risk, borders are inherently part of security continua, working alongside other policing and intelligence agencies, enforcement locales, private actors, and so forth in producing 'security' (however currently conceived); and 6) borders continue to provide the function of securitizing and governing various mobilities and flows (of people, financial instruments, commercial goods, and so forth).

In addition, this revised metaphor must also consider borders within the context of governance. The literature has undoubtedly established borders as technologies of governance (see for example Aas 2011; O'Connor and de Lint 2009; Pratt 2010; Rygiel 2012) including as tools in biopolitical governance (Rygiel 2010; Vaughan-Williams 2010). Governmentality

analyses consider just what rationalities – styles of thinking and ways of rendering reality thinkable – and technologies – assemblages of persons, techniques, and institutions – are employed for the purposes of governing conduct (Rose and Miller 2008: 16). In terms of biopolitics – or the governance of life itself – borders function not by simply isolating and enclosing individuals to execute disciplinary power over them, but rather function to permit circulation, flow, and movement while identifying and cancelling out dangerous circulations (Vaughan-Williams 2010: 1078). As such, biopolitical borders are seen as conforming to characteristics of Deleuze's (1995) control society, in which governance is no longer confined to institutions (as was characteristic of disciplinary societies) but rather is increasingly "more supple, dispersed, and nebulous" (Walters 2002: 574).

SOCIAL SIMULACRA

While early social interactionists like Erving Goffman posited that social interaction and indeed social life unfolds within 'theatres' as if one is examining actors on a stage, Baudrillard (1981) argues instead that the theatre has been displaced by what he calls "the satellization of the real" (Baudrillard 1981: 149). Whereas theatre is employed to feign or dissimilate reality, simulation instead serves to employ logics of control alongside abandoning distinctions between 'real' and 'fake' in "an operation [designed] to deter every real process by its operational double, a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes" (Baudrillard 1981: 4). The real never has to be feigned again given simulation is opposed to representation, employing the 'sign' not as an equivalent but rather as the negation or replacement of every reference (Baudrillard 1981: 11). The sign

does not simply stand in for the 'real', rather, it removes the real and becomes indistinguishable from it.

Simulations in the realm of security unfold as a planned model of infallibility characteristic of maximal security and deterrence (Baudrillard 1981: 65). The object of the game of security is the simulation of certain risks, threats, and events becoming real (prevention), adapting to their hypothetical inevitability (resilience), and ultimately pre-empting them from becoming real. According to Bogard (1996), surveillance has also entered the realm of simulation, with technologies like computer profiling serving to simulate surveillance "in the sense that they precede and redouble a means of observation" and produce "*surveillance in advance of surveillance,* a technology of 'observation before the fact'" (p. 27). And ultimately, simulations come to govern 'the social' in its entirety: "This is the true nuclear fallout: the meticulous operation of technology serves as a model for the meticulous operation of the social. Here, too, *nothing will be left to chance*" (Baudrillard 1981: 63).

The simulation of security in relation to borders is explored by de Lint (2008). He concludes that a sovereign may employ simulation to generate "monsters" that do not exist in reality (de Lint 2008: 177). In terms of borders specifically, de Lint employs a Foucauldian perspective in concluding that the border is a site of performance whereby the sovereign (vis-à-vis petty sovereigns) can stage political violence alongside the frugality associated with liberalism in producing logics of exclusion (de Lint 2008: 180). The border is a stage serving to "cut down abject others or to manipulate subjects / individuals / cohorts with shocking discretionary displays" (de Lint 2008: 180). However, de Lint conceptualizes simulation (and thus also borders) within the context of the theatre of early social interactionism, as a way of 'acting out' and producing metastable border logics elsewhere (de Lint 2008: 181). He neglects

to consider that simulation does not simply work to produce a stage to screen the performance of the sovereign for all to see, but rather simulation (as Baudrillard would contend) serves to remove the stage completely and replace it with something else entirely, namely an abstraction.

Simulation is also employed by Vaughan-Williams (2010) in examining the virtuality of the sovereign ban characteristic of the biopolitics of border security. As the sovereign shifts from governing via discipline to instead 'regularizing' life through biopower, security begins to function not by arresting movement but rather by permitting circulation and flow (Vaughan-Williams 2010: 1078). Accordingly, border policies have shifted from an 'old border' mentality characterized exclusively by governing mobility at physical borders to a "biopolotical apparatus of security in its mobility and enhancement of liberal subjects' movement" (Vaughan-Williams 2010: 1078). Borders become characterized within the context of a continuum, spreading to a variety of sites away from traditional physical borders in attempting to govern mobility. Border security is therefore explained within the context of Baudrillard's (1981) simulation, with neoliberal subjects made virtual (and thus manageable) through technologies of pre-emption, including, for instance, "algorithmic models of risk management based on the profiling of populations" (Vaughan-Williams 2010: 1080).

Vaughan-Williams' discussion of simulation is limited to the extent it does not provide a concrete explanation of how simulation has served to replace the 'reality' of border security with signs. His metaphor hinges on several taken-for-granted conclusions that require closer examination. For instance, Vaughan-Williams never makes clear *how* the virtuality of identity is used by border agents within the continuum to produce the sovereign ban (other than vague conclusions that pre-emption and risk are somehow involved). Vaughan-Williams (2010: 1077) also employs Walters' (2006a) flawed conception of the firewall as a metaphor for how border

security continua function. Lastly, Vaughan-Williams seems to default to a panoptic understanding of the simulation of borders despite his reliance on biopolitics to frame his argument. He does not consider how simulated borders function within post-panoptic societies of control.

THE SIMULATION OF SURVEILLANCE

It is through this conceptualization that contemporary borders are best explored – not as *sites* par excellence for security performances, but rather as part of the simulation of security and surveillance whereby there is no longer a distinction between 'reality' and 'fantasy'. According to Bogard (1996: 9), simulations allow the gap between virtual control and actual control to disappear. What Bogard refers to as telematics societies (societies that perform governance functions 'at a distance') employ simulation technologies toward cutting the time of the transmission of data to zero (Bogard 1996: 9). Accordingly:

> This, for Baudrillard, is our own era, where the circulation of sign-images dominate, but rather than being 'false' images, now have the function of *concealing* the fact that reality itself is absent behind its representation (Bogard 1996: 11).

Bogard refers to this as *panoptic imagery* whereby the architecture of control and orders of space and time characteristic of institutions (see Foucault 1975) are replaced by 'cyberachitectures' as well as coding designed to produce images onscreen anywhere and anytime (Bogard 1996: 19). Reality becomes whatever is programmed within the simulation, with images (or signs) in the simulation serving not as copies of 'the real', but rather as replacements for 'the real' (Bogard 1996: 20). Derrida (1972) discusses the importance of signs in that "The sign represents the present in its absence… The sign, in this sense, is deferred presence" (p. 9).

Signs are ultimately coded and stored in databases as data doubles or dividuals (Deleuze 1992). Indeed, as Dijstelbloem and Broeders (2015) indicate, the inclusion / exclusion dichotomy is no longer useful in terms of describing border control technologies. Rather, in terms of migration, "the insider–outsider distinction is being replaced by a much more heterogeneous handling of technologically constructed non-publics" (Dijstelbloem and Broeders 2015: 23). Accordingly:

> To the authorities at least, [the signs] would become in some ways more real than our real selves, because they would stand in for and verify the reality of those selves in ways that are, or have the potential to be, absolutely certain… Simulation, in fact, would in such cases carry surveillance, the unmasking of reality, to its logical limit and conclusion – perfect information on individuals, perfect exposure, and perfect discipline (Bogard 1996: 21).

According to Bogard, dividuals are reproduced like a photocopy through a Xerox (photocopier) machine in that "Any original only exists, for the Xerox, *to* copy, and thus, for all it cares, *as* a copy" (Bogard 1996: 45). The clone of the original serves as a perfect repetition of the original such that it stands in irrefutably for the original. As this process occurs and dividuals become *the* replicated identity of individuals, and databases proliferate to handle incessant collection of data and refine data doubles as necessary. These technologies serve to simulate surveillance in that they generate a single profile (dividual) from infinitesimal data points derived from various sources (Bogard 1996: 27). Such virtual systems, according to Bogard (1996: 23) are indifferent to human history and personal narrative. The image of the dividual becomes *the* undisputed 'history in advance' for authorities to review (Bogard 1996: 23). According to Bogard (1996: 44) all this promises full front-end control by infallibly guaranteeing certain flows in advance while abandoning the need for strategies of monitoring and security performances. Simulated technologies of surveillance ultimately attempt to produce "the transcendence of limits of time, space, life and death, and the body" (Bogard 1996: 51). As such they are transmutable – anyone

can plug into such databases anywhere and immediately call forth dividuals and manage flows with or without the presence of individuals.

BORDER SIMULACRUM AND CONTROL

Borders as Simulacrum

Borders proceed exactly in the way Bogard (1996) demonstrates that surveillance is simulated. According to the principles outlined above: 1) the work of bordering and related border technologies unfold at an increasing variety of sites, and 2) traditional physical borders persist and continue to perform various functions. States increasingly perform mobility and border governance at a distance, employing visa offices overseas, international policing agencies, third-party commercial carriers, airlines, academic institutions, social welfare agencies, and a variety of other actors in both policing mobility and assisting in information collection on individuals, corporations, and commodities. Such diffusion, as Ericson (2007:4) contends, develops in an attempt to reconcile the fact that 'security' is very much an imaginary given it requires knowledge of a future that is ultimately unknowable. Such reliance on telematic policing means states must solve the problem of governing mobilities and flows in advance of and also at physical borders. To this end, as Bogard (1996: 9) illustrates, surveillance (and indeed policing functions) related to borders can be simulated to eliminate the gap between virtual and physical control and cut the time of the transmission of data to zero.

Such simulation is perfected by the third principle of modern borders, namely, borders and mobility are governed by and through the calculation and analysis of risk. As Ericson (2007: 6) argues, one way societies attempt to control the future is through 'scientific' measures of risk. Data collection proliferates in an attempt to harness risk-management practices in governing the

future. Risk unfolds as a neoliberal technology of governance, with individuals and other entities responsibilized in self-governing personal behavior to ensure their own security and prosperity (Ericson 2007: 6). In terms of borders (and following the fourth principle outlined above), states responsibilize a variety of third parties (visa offices, passport agencies, international policing agencies, third-party commercial carriers, airlines, private citizens, and so forth) in providing data collection functions in advance of physical borders. Accordingly, technologies of governance such as carrier sanctions redesign such spaces as "semi-formal spaces of migration control…" (Walters 2006b: 194). These third parties ultimately become part of border security assemblages – in the style of Haggerty and Ericson's (2000) surveillant assemblage – and, by extension, security continua that rely (in part) on borders (the fifth principle outlined above). Such data collection contributes to the formation of data doubles (or dividuals) in databases. These images (or signs) as part of simulation serve not as *copies* of 'the real', but rather as *replacements* for 'the real' (Bogard 1996: 20).

Whenever someone enters the border security assemblage (when attempting to obtain a visa, when checking in at the airport, when arriving at a physical border, and so forth), his or her body and personal narrative no longer serve as an identity for analysis. Rather, much like the Xerox machine, the original exists only insofar as it brings forth its replacement (the dividual) onto the 'stretched screens' (Lyon 2009) of border agents. Personal narrative is rendered irrelevant as agents already have what is perceived to be a 'history in advance' (Bogard 1996: 23), which is used to govern mobility via risk.

Long before individuals reach physical borders, they have already become part of the border security assemblage, the simulation of security, and have been coded as dividuals. They have (in many ways) been pre-selected prior to arrival. Consider travelers intending to travel to

another country via an airport. Even before they are permitted to board an airplane, individuals are rendered as dividuals and can be excluded in a variety of ways. This process begins when individuals attempt to obtain travel documents (i.e. passports). This serves the function of creating dividuals in databases, cross-referencing new dividuals with established dividuals contained in existing databases, and ultimately serves to exclude: 1) risky others, for example, certain classes of criminals and those suspected of terrorism who are banned from obtaining a passport in their country of origin, 2) those without the ability to establish prior identity (i.e. those without birth records and other required identity documents), and 3) those (primarily) in the global south too poor to purchase a passport or unable to access a passport office.

In many cases, individuals must secure a visa prior to departure in order to travel to their destination country. This part of the border assemblage allows agents to further cross-reference (now established) dividuals with various databases to assess risk, allows for the collection of biometrics for positive identification on the front end (at the visa office) and eventually on the back end (at the physical border), tracks the movement (including failed attempts) of dividuals, and excludes: 1) actual or suspected criminals, terrorists, and other dangerous or high-risk 'others', 2) people without valid passports, 3) those who are impoverished and unable to afford a visa or access a visa office, and 4) individuals from certain 'banned' countries.

Lastly, responsibilized private agents working for airlines at international airports collect data that serves to further establish identity at check-in and adds this information to databases for border officials to examine prior to and during arrival, cross-references the dividual with prior established international and nation-specific databases such as no-fly lists, and excludes: 1) individuals too impoverished to afford tickets or without access to an international airport, 2) individuals without a valid visa or identity document, 3) anyone carrying weapons and/or

dangerous goods at security checkpoints, 4) unlimited travel based on carrier routing, and 5) those dividuals deemed too risky to fly (i.e. on a no-fly list).

In short, before reaching a physical border, travelers transiting through airports – depending on their citizenship and visa requirements of the destination country – may be subjected to no fewer than three identity verifications, one biometric data collection, three identity cross-references with pre-established databases to assess risk, and greater than ten ways to be excluded from travel before even boarding an airplane. International arrivals customs and immigration checkpoints at airports are therefore only receiving a very small and pre-coded fraction of travelers out of all possible travelers in the world. According to Duffield (2010), it is through such mechanisms that the policing of migration alongside global development governance can be seen as complicit in producing a 'planetary order' confining large swaths of the global (south) population *in situ*. In essence, the vast majority of airport arrivals are 'ideal' types of flows that pass all checks and balances and comply with pre-coded risk-management technologies. These travelers have also already been established as dividuals in databases and are therefore 'known' to officials prior to arriving. They hold the proper passwords necessary for mobility within the simulation (explored below). While those arriving at land borders are theoretically subject to less prior scrutiny, the potential 'flood' of mobility is still controlled in a variety of ways via producing dividuals and within simulated borders. This process is enhanced by policies such as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative that mandate the use of passports at borders, serving to construct dividuals regionally in advance of travel.

Borders as Control

To see borders as disciplinary apparatuses of exclusion and 'the ban' is to be definitively retrograde. As borders unfold at an increasing variety of sites and risk is employed to accomplish telematic mobility governance and attempt prediction, borders as technologies of governance effectively abandon exclusive reliance on back-end disciplinary governance in favour instead of front-end control. As Deleuze (1992) contends, there exists two poles in disciplinary societies: "the signature that designates the *individual*, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a *mass*" (p. 5). Power in disciplinary societies is exercised through the individual and the mass via institutions. Conversely, in societies of control, the signature or number is replaced by "a code: the code is a *password*… The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access… We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become '*dividuals*,' and masses, samples, data, markets, or '*banks*' (Deleuze 1992:5). Individuals are replaced in border simulations by dividuals generated in databases through aggregating bits of data. Dividuals come to form 'passwords' (Deleuze 1992) for the purpose of governing mobility. Passwords can be considered as clusters of bits of data that reveal, conceal, and represent nothing but that serve as signs that mark access – they are pure simulation. To agents responsible for border governance, such passwords become "more real than our real selves" (Bogard 1996: 21) and are ultimately mistaken as irrefutable first-order simulations (or copies) of the individual. However, such passwords are, in reality, not reflections of the individual, but rather are nothing more than aggregated data derived from prior movements, passages, exchanges, transactions, and associations. In other words, dividuals are nothing more than the aggregate of past actions and behaviours that are coded as relevant to risk-management practices. Accordingly, a society must code in order to control flows. Non-coded

flows represent a threat in that they may not be controlled, and therefore serve as "the flood, the deleuge which is the flow that breaks through the barriers of codes" (Deleuze 1971). Risk societies rely on the imaginary of perfect knowledge of flows to attempt to control them and regulate mobility and access.

Baudrillard (1981) makes the connection between simulation and societies of control abundantly clear through his examination of an early reality TV program focused on the Loud family. While portrayed as an organic and 'raw' examination of the American family simply going about life as if cameras were not present (something Baudrilliard sees as simple utopian fantasy), Baudrillard (1981: 51) indicates that the family was already hyperreal in their very selection for filming. The family was not randomly selected but rather represented a statistical aggregation of the 'ideal American family'. Much like border subjects, in many ways, the family was 'known' and pre-selected as ideal subjects. They represented (through aggregated data) the characteristic 'dividual' of the American family.

Baudrillard demonstrates how the 'truth' regarding the life of the family was ultimately replaced by the 'truth' of the TV. In short, the TV (much like the stretched screens of border agents) serves to *render truth* (Baudrillard 1981: 51-52). This, to Baudrillard, represents the end of the panoptic gaze and its replacement by "the manipulative truth of the test which probes and interrogates, of the laser that touches and then pierces, of computer cards that retain your punched-out sequences…" (p. 52). Much like the governance of borders through risk, it is no longer the historical narrative of the individual that matters, but rather the pre-coded and value-laden assumptions within simulations that test perceived infallible data located in the dividual. This, according to Baudrillard (1981:52) represents the end of the panoptic system that relied on

a despotic gaze within a defined social space, and its replacement by a society of control that abandons attempts to render individuals transparent in favour of rending them predictable.

As simulations shift governing efforts toward dividuals, it is no longer necessary for individuals to be always seen, heard, and recorded. Rather, it becomes necessary to develop a 'system of mapping' whereby the collection of data contributes to controlling mobility vis-à-vis dividuals. The data characterizing dividuals comes to replace the panoptic image of the individual as the focal point of control. The individual does not need to be actively surveilled at physical borders to produce decisions regarding mobility. Rather, infinitesimal data points can be collected (including by non-state, third-party actors) indefinitely to ascertain the risk of the dividual and govern mobility with or without the physical presence of the individual. The population is no longer governed via the violence and surveillance of the state against individuals characteristic of disciplinary institutions. Rather, biopolitical post-panoptic governance unfolds as a system of deterrence designed to control the mobility of dividuals within simulations (Baudrillard 1981: 53-54). Submission of the individual is no longer necessary, as individuals are instead deterred from participating in 'risky' behaviours that have the potentiality of producing data points that could generate a risky dividual with a password excluding mobility.

IDENTIFYING SIMULATIONS AND CYBORG WORK

As Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter (2014) argue, there is a need for the literature to consider how border security is governed as an everyday practice by those appointed to carry out duties related to it. The strength of theoretical perspectives (like the simulation of borders) can only be derived by considering how they function in relation to the everyday practice of 'bordering'. Recent analyses have examined how border officers in Canada employ risk toward

reaching determinations. This has included employing risk through advanced commercial information (Côté-Boucher 2013: 155-158) as well as surveillance technologies used to produce advanced identification of individuals (Côté-Boucher, 2008). A content analysis of training documents and manuals obtained by the researcher through ATIP requests filed with CBSA was performed to further test the simulation metaphor. According to the "Indicators" CBSA Port of Entry Recruitment Training (POERT)[1] program module:

> One of the main purposes of indicators is to distinguish high-risk travelers from low-risk travelers. Through the use of questioning, document examination, lookouts, enforcement bulletins, intelligence bulletins, database results, and contraband detection tools, [officers] will be able to identify multiple indicators which will allow [them] to determine which travelers pose the highest risk (p. 1).

When identity documents are scanned by officers into CBSA Integrated Primary Inspection Line (IPIL) computer systems, databases present officers with dividuals in return. Risk information is provided about dividuals that automatically leads to further customs and/or immigration processing and searches (irrespective of questions posed by the officer). Various alerts concerning the dividual – lookouts based on intelligence information gathered, previous customs seizures, previous immigration matters, outstanding arrest warrants, or lost or stolen identity documents – produce a level of risk that mandates further processing (CBSA 2015: 20-22). This is confirmed in the "Referrals" POERT module, which states, "A mandatory referral is a referral that a BSO must make for further documentation or examination by Customs… or on behalf of other government departments" (p. 23). The module then lists several types of mandatory customs referrals, including: 1) documentation/permit requirements, 2) payment of duties and

[1] Obtained POERT documents are still applicable for two reasons. First, the new OITP is built on the foundation of POERT. Second, according to CBSA corporate documents, the vast majority of BSOs currently on the frontline were trained using iterations of the late-2000s POERT documents obtained by the researcher given that CBSA increased its frontline ranks from 4000 to 7200 officers from 2006 to 2012 – representing an 80% increase overall – prior to the implementation of OITP in 2014.

taxes, 3) inability of the officer to reach the point of finality with a traveler (including issues surrounding identity), and 4) when a lookout exists on a vehicle license plate or traveler name (p. 23). This module also lists categories for individuals requiring a mandatory referral for immigration secondary, including (but not limited to): people included in inadmissible classes in sections 34 to 42 of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* for reasons of security, violating human rights, serious criminality, general criminality, organized crime, health, financial risk, and so forth (p. 3-7). By employing telematics, CBSA officers are able to reduce the transmission of data to zero. Dividuals (particularly in the case of lookouts) are produced in advance, including through aggregated risk information gleaned from third-party data collection, other agency intelligence information, and private citizen 'tips'. Officers scan identity documents into databases and obtain histories in advance in the form of dividuals in return. The officer essentially has no choice in terms of action with mandatory referrals – the narrative of the individual is rendered irrelevant by the risky dividual (and incompatible password) visible on the officer's screen.

When border officers ask individuals questions related to their travel and associated declarations, agents are not asking questions to the individual (the body) to provide a narrative toward making a determination regarding mobility. Instead, officers are asking questions to the individual to essentially test the risk level of the dividual. Even if the individual provides low-risk answers to queries, the high-risk dividual identified by IPIL databases mandates a referral with the assumption that the person is deceiving the agent and is not being forthcoming. As such, a high-risk dividual with a 'hit' in the database (as outlined above) will always result in a referral for further processing (regardless of how the individual answers questions) (CBSA 2015: 20-22). Conversely, if an individual provides high-risk answers despite their dividual presenting as a low

or unknown risk, they are also highly likely to be referred by the agent to test (and refine if necessary) the information contained in the dividual. Basically, the only way an individual is allowed to proceed without further scrutiny is if the low-risk answers they provide to questions confirm their low-risk dividual. Subsequent secondary customs and immigration searches and questioning serve to further 'test' and refine (as necessary) the dividual. In short, the 'fate' of travelers has been coded in databases and is largely determined before they reach physical borders or answer questions posed by officers.

Additionally, most of the interactions occurring between border agents and individuals are coded and pre-determined in many ways. Officers ask a variety of pre-determined, mandatory questions designed (as stated above) to test the level of risk generated by the dividual. The social interactions that ensue cannot be described as 'organic' in any way. Travelers are limited in how they may answer these questions and ultimately personal narratives – which may serve to 'clarify' the individual – are excluded in favor of concise answers from which the officer may glean whether the individual presents the same level of risk posed by their dividual. If an individual refuses to present his or her dividual or answer questions and participate in the 'test', the traveler is automatically deemed risky and referred for further examination (and potentially detained or excluded). What may appear to the casual observer as an organic information-seeking exercise is actually a highly coded and simulated interaction within a space of security.

It is through such simulations based on advanced information and risk that border agents can be seen as participating in 'cyborg work' (Bogard 1992: 115) whereby perceived inefficiencies and problems associated with officer decision-making are designed out by governing officers from inside the simulation – namely by coding the simulation to produce automated responses to dividuals without allowing for officer discretion. Despite the fact CBSA

officers indicate distrust for risk technologies and insist that *they* ultimately make determinations by asking questions (Côté-Boucher 2013: 172-179), it is without doubt that the lifeworlds (Habermas 1981) of border agents have been colonized by risk to the extent that it is virtually impossible for officers to reach common understandings regarding mobility without reference to the dividual.

Recently, CBSA installed machines at borders in Canada that read RFID-enabled identity documents (and call forth dividuals) at a distance before individuals reach primary inspection (CBSA 2014: 37). Such technologies thrust risk calculations to the forefront of the primary inspection process, and provide officers with tailor-made risk-based decisions in advance of questioning. Where RFID readers are absent, agency policies mandate the manual scanning of identity documents and collection of data pertaining to "Name (first, middle, last), Date of Birth, Nationality/Citizenship, Gender, Document information (type, number and country of issuance)" as well as "Biographic Entry Data" for *every* individual officers process (CBSA 2016). According to Chapter One Part Two "Primary Processing" in the *CBSA People Processing Manual*, "All persons entering Canada at a site equipped with the IPIL system must be queried in IPIL. The officers **must** query each person by capturing the information from a machine-readable travel document or by manually keying the person's information" (p. 31, *emphasis original*). Furthermore, the introduction of Automated Border Clearance (ABC) kiosks at Canada's busiest international airports in Vancouver (2009), Montreal (2012), and Toronto (2013) further indicate how Canadian borders and officer decision-making are governed via simulations and risk. According to Chapter 10 Part 2 "Primary Processing" in the *CBSA People Processing Manual,* travelers scan identity documents and self-declaration forms (E311) at ABC kiosks. The kiosks generate a risk score and referral code for the traveler, and:

> The system generated results of the risk assessment and the traveler's responses on the E311 [form] will determine if a referral to secondary processing is warranted. The kiosk will generate a receipt (copy of E311) and the traveler proceeds to the BSO performing document verification function to present their travel document and kiosk receipt… The BSO shall not release travelers if a secondary referral code is printed on the kiosk receipt but should direct the traveler to the BSO at triage (P. 151).

Combined, RFID readers, policies mandating officers scan all identity documents, and ABC kiosks produce technologies of automation that serve to double-down on computerized risk-management practices that govern the actions of officers vis-à-vis risk within the simulation. In short, risk management pervades and governs officer decision-making regardless of their perceived levels of complicity. While the aforementioned analysis pertains exclusively to CBSA, the employment of risk-management practices, databases, RFID technologies, and document readers by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Frontex, and other Western border agencies implies these practices are likely widespread.

Additionally, the strength of the simulation metaphor for the governance of mobility and borders lies in its direct applicability not only to Canada Border Services Agency and other border agencies, but also to other fields of policing and security. Examples of such security simulation can be found in disaster and resilience planning scenarios that completely obscure the distinction between real and fake while supporting goals of maximal security and deterrence in making life programmatic (see for example Anderson 2010; Bourbeau 2013; Coaffee 2013; Walklate, Mythen, and McGarry 2012). Whether security actors are participating in scenarios or 'real-world' events, their actions and behavior in each case become indistinguishable and guided through risk. O'Malley (2010) documents the increased use of 'telemetric policing' models such as traffic light cameras issuing fines to drivers through license plate databases. Such modes of policing replace the individual with the dividual as the focal point of power within 'simulated

space'. Accordingly, such simulations ultimately serve to produce 'simulated justice' whereby individuals are no longer permitted recourse. In fact, the individual need not even be physically present at the time of the offence to be fined, with 'deeming provisions' within legislation placing a reverse onus on the 'offender' to prove "either that the vehicle was not speeding or that another dividual owned or drove it at the time of the offence" (O'Malley 2010: 800). Similarly, many policing agencies have now adopted intelligence-led policing models driven by data collection. Initiatives like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Criminal Intelligence Program function by collating information from investigations and 'other sources' (i.e. phone records, bank statements, ISP data, and other third-party data) which is ultimately analyzed by criminal intelligence analysts to produce threat assessments (RCMP 2014). Such models of policing are inherently simulated and operate within the society of control in that, once again, the dividual serves as the unit of analysis in terms of identifying and acting on risk. Lastly, the use of ASBOs, licensing (Valverde 2003; Valverde 2012), zoning (Crofts et al. 2013; Hubbard and Colosi 2012; Valverde 2011), and recent innovations such as off-limits orders (Beckett and Herbert 2008; Palmer and Warren 2014) are employed in urban environments to control conduct vis-à-vis employing logics of risk and computerization in excluding dividuals from mobility within various public and private social spaces.

Simply put, simulation not only characterizes how contemporary borders are governed, but rather is symptomatic of governance efforts generally within the society of control. Such reliance on technology and risk in producing simulations is troubling for several reasons. Simulations ultimately unfold at the will of software programmers. Taylor (2003), in examining virtual worlds, concludes that a simulated environment exists the way it does because a human being coded it to be so. The dangers for humans in terms of border simulations are easily

identifiable. In short, mobility is only permitted insofar as it meets the 'embedded values' (Taylor 2003:28) promoted in a simulation's coding. Such embedded values (including just what is considered 'risky') can be changed at the whim of the coder. In short, virtually any dividual can be rendered risky (and thus immobile) simply by re-coding the parameters of the simulation. Rather than risk locating the truth, what is 'true' becomes generated *by* risk, with risk being particularly vulnerable to social definition and construction in ways that are far from scientific or objective (Beck 1992:22-23). This conclusion raises further concerns about data 'function creep' (Haggerty and Ericson 2006) and a general lack of avenues for individuals to 'exit' simulations or seek judicial remedies for established risky dividuals. In short, simulations and the coding of dividuals render as fantasy any desire to manage or conceal 'spoiled identity' (Goffman 1963).

CONCLUSION

The aforementioned metaphor of simulation works for contemporary borders given it incorporates (as described above) each of the six principles agreed upon in the literature concerning contemporary border security. As borders unfold at an increasing variety of sites, simulation is ultimately employed to close the gap between virtual and physical governance of mobility. Risk is employed to accomplish telematic mobility governance and attempt prediction, with dividuals ultimately produced in databases that serve as *the* unit of analysis for agents within the border security assemblage. To constantly acquire and refine data and thus also ascertain the level of risk posed by dividuals, a variety of third parties are responsibilized in collecting and reporting data on behalf of the state. These third parties are responsibilized along with the state in serving as part of larger security continua that rely (in part) on borders to securitize an ever-increasing range of social life in feeding into neoliberal demands for data

required for risk-management efforts focused on prediction and pre-emption. Such demands and the 'routine failure of risk', as Ericson (2007: 12) contends, simply produces further pressure to collect more data to feed the continuum and govern risk. Diffusion of the continuum (including borders) in securitizing additional non-traditional sites becomes necessary to feed the insatiable appetite for data. Risk and insecurity only produce more risk and insecurity in an ever-amplifying spiral of securitization. Simulation, then, serves to make virtuality possible, producing dividuals, controlling mobility under the guise of perfect predictability, and securitizing more and more social life through risk. While aforementioned analysis exclusively considered the mobility of individuals, conclusions are transferable to mobility of all things governed through risk, including (but not limited to) financial instruments, commercial goods, and information.

The simulation of borders also coincides with Deleuze's (1995) description of the society of control. As institutions characteristic of disciplinary society are increasingly abandoned as *the* model of governance of individuals and masses, the dividual is produced within the society of control. Power in societies of control is exercised not through the individual within institutions, but rather through dividuals. The data characterizing dividuals comes to replace the panoptic image of the individual as the focal point of control. In terms of border simulations, the individual does not need to be actively surveilled at physical borders to produce decisions regarding mobility. Rather, infinitesimal data points can be collected (including by non-state third-party actors) indefinitely to ascertain the risk of the dividual, generate passwords, and govern mobility through control.

Lastly, the simulation metaphor also avoids debates surrounding binary border mandates and geographic imaginaries that have plagued recent interdisciplinary border literature.

Simulation can accommodate (at the same time) the continued existence of traditional sovereign borders alongside 'diffusion' to a potentially infinite number of non-traditional and/or third-party sites. Debates surrounding the changing importance of physical borders within the context of telemetric borders are also irrelevant given that potentially each and every site contributes equally to the simulation of surveillance, the border security assemblage, and the production, analysis, and refinement of data doubles and dividuals. Each site (whether at the frontier of the nation state or elsewhere) is coded to govern flows and mobilities according to the simulation. Borders are not really 'moving' or 'spreading'. Rather, simulated borders are truly *anywhere* and *anytime* as part of security continua that serve to securitize an ever-increasing range of social life. This is the major conclusion that Vaughan-Williams (2010) and de Lint (2008) do not fully consider in discussing the simulation of borders – namely, via simulation borders exist anywhere social life is already securitized, anywhere security continua have already reached, and anywhere life and mobility are already simulated. It is through this conclusion that Baudrillard's (1981) dystopian supposition – that the true nuclear fallout is simulation of our entire social world – becomes realized. Through simulation and virtuality, borders, as Lyon (2005) contends, are truly *everywhere*.

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